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ABSTRACT: Over the course of history, different means of object as well as person identification and verification have
evolved for user authentication. In recent years, a new concern has emerged regarding the accuracy of authentication and of
protection of personal identifying information (PII), because previous information systems (IS) misuses have resulted in
significant financial loss. Such losses have escalated more noticeably because of identity-theft incidents due to breaches of
PII within multiple public-access environments, such asinstitutions of higher-education. Although the use of various biometric
and radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies is expanding, resistance to using these technologies remains an
issue. As such, in this research-in-progress paper, we outline a predictive study to assess the contribution of campus students’
perceptions of the importance of protecting their PII, noted as Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of PII (PVOP),
authentication complexity (AC), and invasion of privacy (IOP) on their resistance to using multi-method authentication
systems (RMS) in higher-education environments. In this work-in-progress study, we seek to better understand the theoretical
foundations for the effect of students’ perceptions on their resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in
higher-education environments and uncover key constructs that may significantly contribute to such resistance. A quasi-
experiment is proposed including clearly identified procedures and data analyses.
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1. Introduction
Recent research suggested that electronic-commerce (e-commerce) transactions are not the primary source of identity theft
(Collins, 2003; Newman, 2004). However, Shareef, Kamur, and Vinod (2012) proposed that identity theft plays a substantial role
in purchase resistance for consumers of e-commerce. Increasing demands to prevent identity theftare advocated in recent
literature, newspapers, and government policies. According to Shareef et al. (2012), “current research addresses the
issues of identity theft; source, type, and preventative measuring tools” (p. 30). Additional studies indicated that inadequate
user authentication (UA) methods are a contributing factor for identity theft(Fichtman, 2001). A national survey conducted by
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2008) revealed that 4.7% of American adults experienced identity theftthat involved the
loss of personal identifying information (PII), while such numbers appear to grow rapidly every year. Industry responses to
combat the aspects of identity theftare focused on the verifiable identification of individuals through the development of
acceptable multi-method authentication systems (Bellah, 2001). While current research has shown significant advances in
biometric recognition, users continue to resist using biometric technology to enhance password security including in institutionsof
higher-education (Levy & Ramim, 2009). This resistance is attributed to concerns related to protecting their PII, invasion of
privacy (IOP), and authentication complexity (AC).
It appears that a need exists to better understand the problem with identity theftescalation as a result of users sharing, reusing,
and losing passwords, as well as the mishandling of PII during e-commerce transactions also in the context of institutions of
higher-education (Furnell, Dowland, Illingworth, & Reynolds, 2000). This has resulted in significant losses from illegal
authentication and theft of PII. Efforts to combat the weaknesses in current methods of username/password entries have
influenced the development of biometric forms of identification (Altinkemer & Wang, 2011). However, single-authentication
biometrics still exhibit misreads and susceptibility to spoofing vulnerability, so organizations have turned to testing multi-
method authentication systems for user authentication (Gunson, Marshall, Morton, & Jack, 2010). Increased monetary losses
occurring due to privacy attacks during e-commerce activities within organizations have swayed individuals’ perceptions of the
importance of protecting PII (PVOP), lessened their use of Internet purchasing, and could influence their resistance to new
authentication methods (Dowling & Staelin, 1995; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Presently, many of the charges for tuition,
books, dormitories, meal plans, trips, and other activities both on-campus as well as off-campus are conducted over the Internet
or via kiosks throughout their campus. As a result of these increasing demands, institutions of higher-education are implementing
chip-based student IDs that can incorporate the student biometric characteristics. However, little is known about the various
factors affecting resistance to using multi-method authentication systems in higher-education environments. As such, this
work-in-progress research is aimed atproposing a model tovalidate empirically the contribution of the constructs of PVOP, IOP,
and AC on individual’s resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) in higher-education environments.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Perceived Value of Organizational Protection of Personal Identifying Information
According to Dowling and Staelin (1994) as well as Mayer et al. (1995), the PVOP of PII is demonstrated by the elevated concerns
of IOP resulting from financial losses occurring from identity theft. These losses are increasing due to individuals exhibiting
unsafe password behaviors such as reusing and sharing passwords, as well as the lack of awareness of the costs associated
with PII theft (Eisenstein, 2008; Furnell, 2008; Kumar, Mohan, & Holowczak, 2008; Levy, 2008). Users are unaware that illegal
access to PII enables unauthorized access to use, copy, release, destroy, deny, or gain access to create imposter accounts
(Furnell, 2008; Obrien, 2002; Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008).
According to Eisenstein (2008), PII loss stems from a variety of causes, resulting in significant financial loss. These occurrences
include merchant failures to protect client data under their personal control, stolen mail, computer data breaches; illegally
reproduced pay sites such as PayPal©, viruses, and phishing scams (Furnell, 2008; Kumar, 2008; Shaw et al., 2008). Furnell (2008)
identified users as a) those informed of areas of identity theftrisk and are doing something to protect themselves, as opposed to
b) those who remain indifferent to the seriousness of the loss of PII.
2.2 Invasion of Privacy
According to Karyda and Gritzalis (2009), privacy can generally be defined as “the individual’s ability to control the terms by
which their [sic] personal information is collected and used” (p. 195). Thus, the prevention of IOP could represent protection
or freedom from interference by others (Gritzalis, 2004). The concept of acknowledging an individual’s right to privacy includes
the factors of necessity, finality, transparency, and proportionality (Karyda & Gritzalis, 2009).
Furthermore, privacy crusader Alan Westin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves, when, where, how, and to what extent information about themselves is communicated to others” (Hough, 2009,
p.7). However, Westin’s contemporary, David Flaherty, separated privacy further into four sections. His four sections are
comprised of:
Solitude: The perfect and unblemished state of privacy whereby you can easily restrict access to yourself from others by
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withdrawing your presence.
Intimacy: This is a by membership only and groups protect their members.
Anonymity: This is a form of being “off the grid” in that you are able to protect yourself from ongoing public recognition or
involvement.
Reserve: This is the measure of trust that one places in others not to disclose specific information about oneself, such as what,
where, when, and how (Hough, 2009).
2.3 Authentication Complexity
Furnell et al. (2004) reported on a study of alternative authentication methods. Their study identified infrastructures as trying to
cope with the increasing number of password-protected systems. Adding to the growing burden are Websites, resulting in the
ever-increasing occurrences of reuse and sharing of password-sensitive authentications. Regardless, security personnel still
prefer password and personal identification number (PIN) usage as trade-offs, as the number of imposters and false alarm rates
are still high. Thus, the responsibility of memorizing, not sharing, multitudes of passwords, and not sharing any with others is
not easy, due to their inconvenience. Such issue can result in significant security breaches of PII and in identity theft. Sasse et
al. (2001) conducted a study that indicated that with PINs being more difficult for customers to remember than passwords,
individuals are resorting back to using date of birth or writing information on paper.
Furthermore, Furnell et al. (2004) identified UA methods that provide lowered identity theftoccurrences as single-factor
authentications, based on something that the user knows (e.g. passwords or PIN), possesses (smart card, token, or RFID
device), or is (e.g. a biometric characteristics like fingerprints, eye retina, face, voice, etc.). Multi-factor authentication can be
based on any two of these methods combined (Levy & Ramim, 2009; O’Gorman, 2003). Furthermore, Murdoch, Drimer, Anderson,
and Bond (2010) conducted a study that showed that strengths in multi-factor authentication systems indicated a remarkable
decline in fraud following a compulsory usage requirement after implementation. This decline is significant in that other online
banking fraud rose by 55% during the same time period (Gunson et al., 2010). As a result of increased fraud leading to identity
theft, two-factor authentication use is increasing in the UK within outside vendor use. However, the fraud rate with single-factor
authentication, within known banking entities, remains unaffected (Gunson et al., 2010).
2.4 Mixed-Method Authentication Systems
With increasing demands being placed on the financial service industries, enhanced means of protecting PII through added
security measures is being investigated (Hiltgen et al., 2006). According to Weir et al. (2009), mixed methods of identification are
referred to as multi-method, or two-factor, authentication, versus single-factor, and are being tested as well as implemented in
varying degrees. Two-factor authentication is comprised of multiple objects such as card readers or tokens represented by
‘what you have’, in addition to a multitude of other types of identification. These other authentications refer to passwords/PINs
or biometric devices identified as ‘personal characteristics.’ Some of these recognized biometric traits are voiceprints, facial
features, fingerprints, and gait. Additionally, radio frequency identification is increasingly being used in financial transactions
through mobile devices.
According to Coventry, De Angeli, and Johnson (2003), gaining secure access to sensitive areas through possession of held
objects, knowledge, or physical characteristics has accelerated significantly through a multitude of consumer devices, services,
vehicles, and banking interfaces. However, this expansion of methods to gain authentication has resulted in a battle of supremacy
between usability, memorability of passwords, securing of PII, and a consideration of multi-method authentication systems
(Adams & Chang, 1993; Adams & Sasse, 1999; Levy & Ramim, 2009; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2001). According to De
Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, Johnson, Cameron, and Fischer (2002) as well as Dhamija and Perrig (2000), the continual upgrading
of mixed methods of password usage impacts the complexity levels of authentication methods. This impact comprises replacing
PINs with forms of biometric identification that includes photos and fingerprints (De Angeli, Coutts, Coventry, Johnson,
Cameron, & Fischer, 2002; Dhamija, & Perrig, 2000).
2.5 Resistance to using Multi-method authentication systems
Resistance to using multi-method authentication systems (RMS) is defined as the reluctance to accept alternative methods of
user verification due to perceived security, complexity, and privacy concerns (Bellah, 2001; Van Hoose, 2008). According to
Huixian and Liaojun (2009), the challenge of providing “privacy protection of biometric data has become a common concern of
the public” (p. 295). Therefore, IOP is recognized as a significant influence over the degree of acceptance of biometric-
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based authentication. Biometric technologies come with an array of problems that are both technical as well as behavioral (Pons
& Polak, 2008). These difficulties include data degradation and variances in data recorded. However, resistance to usingis
“based on attitudes and behaviors related to user acceptance, trust, habits, etc”. (p. 115). As a result of inconsistent attitudes
regarding the concerns over privacy, storage, protection, and the potential loss of PII, the measuring of user resistance is a
challenging task. This can be attributed to users exhibiting fear, hesitancy, and discomfort over demands to change from current
forms of authentication (Pons & Polak, 2008).
3. Research Problem and Study Goals
This research problem that we seek to address is identity-theft incidents due to breaches of personal identifying information
(PII) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Such PII breaches are significant threats to invasion of
privacy (IOP) during e-commerce activities by users in public-access environments, including higher-education (Venkatesh et
al., 2003; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). Kim, Jeong, Kim, and So (2011) identified PII as financial card numbers, usernames, passwords,
medical records, driver’s licenses, and Social Security numbers (Kim et al., 2011). These PII represent targets of online theft
during e-commerce activities. Doolin, Dillon, Thompson, and Corner (2005) defined e-commerce as information networks that
enable data flow for business, capital, and logistical support. Existing methods to protect PII during e-commerce activities are
based on three types of authentication: username/password, tokens/smart cards, and biometrics (Levy & Ramim, 2009; Millett
& Holden, 2003). According to Venkatesh et al. (2003), resistance to accepting emerging technology is based on the difference
between an individual’s nonadoption and his or her acceptance levels. Thus, resistance on the part of individuals may be the
cause of significant failures in the implementation of multi-method authentication systems(Robey, Ross, & Boudreau, 2002).
We attempt to achieve six research goals. The first three specific goals are to investigate empirically the contribution of PVOP,
IOP, and AC to RMS, respectively, in higher-education environments. The fourth specific goal is to investigate empirically the
contribution of the interaction of the three independent variables, PVOP, IOP, and AC on students RMS in higher-education
environments. The fifth specific goal is to investigate empirically whether any significant differences of PVOP, IOP, AC, and
RMS exist based on students’ ages (AGE), gender (GEN), person’s prior experience with identity theft (EXP), and person’s
acquaintance experience with identity theft (EXA).
The main research question (RQ) that this study will address is: What is the contribution of PVOP, IOP, AC, and interaction on
students’ resistance to using multi-method authentication systems in higher-education environments?
In addressing the main RQ, this proposed study will seek to assessthree specific directional propositions and six hypotheses
(noted in null form):
P1: Perceptions of the importance of protecting PII (PVOP) will have a statistically significant negativeinfluence on students’
resistance to using a multi-method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
P2: Invasion of privacy (IOP) will have a statistically significantpositive influence on students’ resistance to using a multi-
method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
P3: Authentication Complexity (AC) will have a statistically significant positiveinfluence on students’ resistance to using a
multi-method authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
H4: There will be no significant interaction effect of PVOP, IOP, and AC on students’ resistance to using a multi-method
authentication system (RMS) in higher-education environments.
H5a: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on age (AGE).
H5b: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on gender (GEN).
H5c: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s prior experience with identity
theft (EXP).
H5d: PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS will have no statistically significant difference based on person’s acquaintance experience with
identity theft (EXA).
H6: There will be no statistically significant differences on PVOP, IOP, AC, and RMS based on students who used a multi-
method authentication system in higher-education environments and those who haven’t.
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Figure 1. Proposed Conceptual Map for Predicting RMS in higher-education environments
Figure 1 presents the proposed conceptual map for predicting RMS in higher-education environments.
4. Experimental Research and Methodology
To investigate the effects of introducing multibiometrics for user authentication, a lab experiment will be implemented. Three
groups consisting of two experimental and one control will be used (Levy & Ellis, 2011). As indicated above, organizations, both
public and private, require secure authentication to their systems to ensure protection of data and certainty as to prevention of
privacy intrusion. This research seeks to uncover whether multibiometrics can be accepted as a means of authentication by
users without added complexity.  Control Group A will consist of approximately 50 participants. Experimental Group B will consist
of approximately 50 participants. Control Group C will consist of 50 participants. The experimental study participants will consist
of students from a local private university that has various degrees for differing academic levels. All participants in the three
groups will be randomly assigned. The experiment is planned over the timeframe of a full term consisting of 11 weeks.To measure
the effects of resistance to using multibiometrics for user authentication, a system will be set up whereby all three groups will
asked to log in to the system using a different method for each group. Once logged in, the users will be asked to answer a Web-
based survey. The system will track the number of logon attempts for each group. The survey will also ask the participants
questions to measure each of the constructs (PVOP, IOP, AC, & RMS), and questions to collect some demographics information
needed for the analysis (AGE, GEN, EXP, & EXA).
Following the experimental data collection, a pre-analysis data screening process will be conducted to be certain that the
accuracy of data collected doesn’t improperly influence validity results (Levy, 2006; Mertler & Vannatta, 2010; Tabachnich &
Fidell, 1996). Following that, the data will be analyzed using Partial Least Square (PLS) and a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) to address the hypotheses proposed. Moreover, descriptive analysis will be done to provide some statistics about
the participants.
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5. Conclusions
This work-in-progress study is anticipated to provide greater understanding and contribution to the field of Information
Security in the context of higher-education in two significant ways. First, it will investigate the biometric and RFID technologies
that affect resistance (RMS) in higher-education environments during e-commerce activities that have been developed to
respond to the increasing number of occurrences of identity theft either on-campus or off-campus. Second, it will investigate the
primary constructs of PVOP, IOP, and AC contributing to students’ RMS, while controlled for age (AGE), gender (GEN), identity
theft experience (EXP), and the experience of acquaintance (EXA) in higher-education environments. Thus, the results of this
study are anticipated to help in providing recommendations for both the research and use of multibiometrics systems in public
access environments. It is the main objective and hope of this study to be able to determine which of the constructs has a
significant contribution on RMS.
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